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The Law and Politics of
Ransomware
Asaf Lubin*
ABSTRACT
What do Lady Gaga, the Royal Zoological Society of Scotland, the
city of Valdez in Alaska, and the court system of the Brazilian state of
Rio Grande do Sul all have in common? They have all been victims of
ransomware attacks, which are growing both in number and severity.
In 2016, hackers perpetrated roughly four thousand ransomware
attacks a day worldwide, a figure which was already alarming. By
2020, however, ransomware attacks reached a staggering number,
between twenty thousand and thirty thousand per day in the United
States alone. That is a ransomware attack every eleven seconds, each of
which cost victims on average nineteen days of network downtime and
a payout of over $230,000. In 2021 global costs associated with
ransomware recovery exceeded $20 billion.
This Article offers an account of the regulatory challenges
associated with ransomware prevention. Situated within the broader
literature on underenforcement, the Article explores the core causes for
the limited criminalization, prosecution, and international cooperation
that have exacerbated this wicked cybersecurity problem. In particular,
the Article examines the forensic, managerial, jurisdictional,
informational, and resource allocation challenges that have plagued the
fight against digital extortions in the global commons.
To address these challenges, the Article makes the case for the
international criminalization of ransomware. Relying on existing
international regimes––namely, the 1979 Hostage Taking Convention,
the 2000 Convention Against Transnational Crime, and the customary
prohibition against the harboring of terrorists––the Article makes the
claim that most ransomware attacks are already criminalized under
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existing international law. In fact, the Article draws on historical
analysis to portray the criminalization of ransomware as a “fourth
generation” in the outlawry of Hostis Humani Generis (enemies of
mankind).
The Article demonstrates the various opportunities that could arise
from treating ransomware gangs as international criminals subject to
universal jurisdiction. The Article focuses on three immediate
consequences that could arise from such international criminalization:
(1) expanding policies for naming and shaming harboring states, (2)
authorizing extraterritorial cyber enforcement and prosecution, and (3)
advancing strategies for strengthening cybersecurity at home.
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INTRODUCTION

On 10 June 2019, the quaint town of Lake City, Florida suffered a
major ransomware attack, bringing most municipal activities and
services to a halt.1 An employee of the town opened a malicious email
with a compromised document that infected the city’s computers with
a ransomware. 2 Beginning at 7:30 am, “the computers did not work and
neither did the telephones. Even cellphones were wiped of
contacts . . . . Nearly all of the city’s systems—including its water and
gas payment systems—were unusable. The copy machines, also linked
to the computer network, did not work.”3 With about sixteen terabytes
of information effectively locked and online payment systems
inoperable, the city was running blind. 4 City employees were forced to
go back to “paper receipts and hand-written building permits.”5
Ransomware attacks are designed to deny access to a computer
system or data, usually by encrypting it, until the victim pays extortion
payments to the attacker.6 The ransomware used in Lake City’s attack
was the Ryuk malware.7 According to the United Kingdom’s National
Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), “Ryuk was first seen in August 2018

1.
See Patricia Mazzei, Another Hacked Florida City Pays a Ransom, This Time
for $460,000, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/us/lakecity-florida-ransom-cyberattack.html [https://perma.cc/7CNR-NC3S] (archived Aug. 12,
2022).
2.
See 2nd Florida City in Just a Week to Pay Hackers Big Ransom for Seized
Computer
systems,
CBS
NEWS
(June
26,
2019),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ransomware-attack-lake-city-florida-pay-hackersransom-computer-systems-after-riviera-beach/ [https://perma.cc/VAE9-CDR7] (archived
Aug. 12, 2022).
3.
Frances Robles, A City Paid a Hefty Ransom to Hackers. But Its Pains Are
Far
From
Over.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
7,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/07/us/florida-ransom-hack.html
[https://perma.cc/WT5X-2XBZ] (archived Aug. 12, 2022).
4.
Id.
5.
Antonio Villas-Boas, A Florida City Was Forced to Use Pen and Paper and
Pay a $500,000 Ransom After Hackers Took Control of its Computers, BUS. INSIDER (June
27, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/lake-city-florida-ransomware-cyberattackhackers-bitcoin-payment-2019-6 [https://perma.cc/C2XS-KGMS] (archived Aug. 12,
2022).
6.
The Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and Health and Human
Services define a ransomware as a “type of malicious software cyber actors use to deny
access to systems or data. The malicious cyber actor holds systems or data hostage until
the ransom is paid. After the initial infection, the ransomware attempts to spread to
shared storage drives and other accessible systems. If the demands are not met, the
system or encrypted data remains unavailable, or data may be deleted.” See U.S. DEP’T
OF JUST.,
RANSOMWARE: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT,
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/file/872766/download (last visited Sept. 21, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/SF95-JZKR] (archived Aug. 12, 2022).
7.
See Catalin Cimpanu, Florida City Fires IT Employee After Paying Ransom
Demand Last Week, ZDNET (July 1, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/florida-cityfires-it-employee-after-paying-ransom-demand-last-week/
[https://perma.cc/6PP6-Z2
M3] (archived Aug. 12, 2022).
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and has been responsible for multiple attacks globally.”8 The NCSC
further determined that Ryuk is “often not observed until a period of
time after the initial infection––ranging from days to months––which
allows the [malicious] actor time to carry out reconnaissance inside an
infected network, identifying and targeting critical network systems
and therefore maximising the impact of the attack.”9
Just like clockwork, days after the initial infection, a ransom
demand made its way to Lake City officials. At first the city attempted
to restore its systems to full operability with the help of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and a consulting firm,10 hired by its
municipal risk pool, Florida League of Cities.11 Unfortunately, like
many other cities across America, Lake City did not devote sufficient
resources to cybersecurity and lacked basic features that could have
prevented its computer networks from being vulnerable to this attack,
or at least allow for faster recovery.12 Indeed, within two weeks from
the incident, the city manager made a decision to fire the city’s
information technology (IT) director for failures relating to the
incident.13
Failing to restore network operability, the city’s risk pool hired a
ransomware
negotiations
company
called
Coveware
that
communicated with the hackers and brought their ransom demands
down to from eighty-six Bitcoins (about $700,000 based on the rate at
the time) to forty-two Bitcoins (roughly $460,000), of which the city
only paid the $10,000 deductible with the League of Cities paying the

8.
NAT’L CYBER SEC. CTR., ADVISORY: RYUK RANSOMWARE TARGETING
ORGANISATIONS
GLOBALLY
(June
21,
2019),
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/RYUK%20Advisory%20draft%20CP%20June%202019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y6NP-YG9C] (archived Aug. 12, 2022).
9.
Id.
10. See Robles, supra note 3. The exact scope of the FBI’s involvement in the case
is not publicly known but it would seem to have been limited to restoration attempts of
the data. See id.
11. A risk pool is a “nonprofit, mission-driven organization formed by a group of
local government entities, usually within one state, to finance a risk, typically by pooling
or sharing that risk. The entities themselves own and govern the pool. Technically, in
most states, a pool is not an insurer, does not issue insurance policies, and is not
regulated by the state insurance commissioner—at least not to the same degree as a
commercial insurer. But the services a pool provides are virtually indistinguishable from
insurance.” John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 1539, 1557–58 (2017). According to one estimate, “[a]cross America, more than 500
of these pools exist, covering everything from transit authorities to counties.” Jonathan
G.
Steiner,
The
Risk
Pool
Advantage,
N.H.
MUN.
ASS’N
(2010),
https://www.nhmunicipal.org/town-city-article/risk-pool-advantage
[https://perma.cc/4FGG-9A7Z] (archived Aug. 13, 2022).
12. See Villas-Boas, supra note 5.
13. See Patty Matamoros & Francesca Stewart, UPDATE: Lake City Fires
Employee After Paying Ransom in Malware Attack, WCJB (June 26, 2019),
https://www.wcjb.com/content/news/City-of-Lake-City-moves-Forward-after-CyberAttack-511802711.html [https://perma.cc/6CCQ-HL8F] (archived Aug. 13, 2022).
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rest.14 Ultimately, even with the encryption key provided by the
hackers, each terabyte of encrypted data took “about 12 hours to
recover,” and nearly “a month after the onset of the attack,” the city
was still not able to return to full operations.15 Moreover, the city’s own
budget reports have indicated that beyond the ransom the city had to
pay upward of $350,000 in expenses relating to the ransomware attack
as well as other costs associated with equipment and software to
update system security and IT infrastructure across the city.16
Lake City is not alone. From a power distribution company in
India,17 through the Royal Zoological Society of Scotland,18 to the court
system of the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul,19 ransomware is
anywhere and everywhere. In the United States, ransomware has
become so prevalent that it has been identified as a national security
concern triggering the involvement of the U.S. Cyber Command and
the National Security Agency.20 In recent years, ransomware attacks
targeted a regional hospital in Indiana, 21 a school district in

14. Renee Dudley, The Extortion Economy: How Insurance Companies Are
Fueling a Rise in Ransomware Attacks, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 27, 2019),
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-extortion-economy-how-insurance-companiesare-fueling-a-rise-in-ransomware-attacks [https://perma.cc/6MC3-JFCS] (archived Aug.
13, 2022).
15. See Robles, supra note 3.
16. See LAKE CITY, FLA., FY 19 BUDGET AMENDMENT #1, (2019),
https://www.lcfla.com/sites/default/files/fileattachments/finance/page/1635/budget_ame
ndment_1_-_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/65PH-A64H] (archived Aug. 13, 2022).
17. See Pierluigi Paganini, Systems at a Power Company in India infected by a
ransomware, SEC. AFFS. (Mar. 30, 2018), https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/
70836/hacking/power-company-ransomware.html
[https://perma.cc/DE96-XRDN]
(archived Aug. 13, 2022).
18. See David Paul, National Trust and Edinburgh Zoo Latest Victims of
Blackbaud Hack, DIGIT NEWS (July 29, 2020), https://digit.fyi/national-trust-andedinburgh-zoo-latest-victims-of-ransomware-hack/
[https://perma.cc/9RS5-8K9U]
(archived Aug. 13, 2022).
19. See Garrett Thompson, Brazilian Courts Face Ransomware for Second Time
in Recent Months, BINARY DEF. (May 3, 2021), https://www.binarydefense.com/
threat_watch/brazilian-courts-face-ransomware-for-second-time-in-recent-months/
[https://perma.cc/USY5-PH5K] (archived Aug. 13, 2022).
20. See Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Military Has Acted Against Ransomware Groups,
General Acknowledges, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/12/05/us/politics/us-military-ransomware-cyber-command.html [https://perma.cc/
DF45-WYT6] (archived Aug. 13, 2022).
21. See Vic Ryckaert, Hackers Held Patient Data Ransom, So Greenfield Hospital
System
Paid
$50,000,
INDIANAPOLIS
STAR
(Jan.
17,
2018),
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/crime/2018/01/17/hancock-health-paid-50-000hackers-who-encrypted-patient-files/1040079001/
[https://perma.cc/QY5F-PSBA]
(archived Aug. 13, 2022).
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Michigan,22 a courthouse in Texas,23 and a port in California.24 Even
Lady Gaga is not immune.25
The problem has become so profound that comedian John Oliver
devoted a segment of Last Week Tonight to it, noting that the threat
has gone from a “trickle to an absolute flood.”26 Ransomware is growing
not just in numbers, but also in severity. In 2016, hackers perpetrated
roughly four thousand ransomware attacks a day worldwide, a figure
which was already alarming.27 By 2020, however, “attacks leveled out
at 20,000 to 30,000 per day in the U.S. alone.”28 That is a ransomware
attack every eleven seconds,29 each of which cost victims on average
nineteen days of network downtime and a payout of over $230,000. 30
In 2021, global costs associated with ransomware recovery exceeded
$20 billion.31 Some now predict that by 2031 ransomware will cost

22. See Khristopher J. Brooks, Ransomware Attack Shuts Down Some Michigan
Schools, CBS NEWS (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ransomware-attackshuts-down-richmond-michigan-school-district/ [https://perma.cc/4B56-G6ZE] (archived
Aug. 13, 2022).
23. See Travis Bubenik, Hackers Target Texas Courts in Ransomware Attack,
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (May 11, 2020), https://www.courthousenews.com/hackerstarget-texas-courts-in-ransomware-attack/ [https://perma.cc/Z2L5-CACK] (archived
Aug. 13, 2022).
24. See Alfred Ng, Ransomware attack hits Port of San Diego, CNET (Sept. 28,
2018), https://www.cnet.com/news/port-of-san-diego-hit-with-disruptive-ransomwareattack/ [https://perma.cc/53QG-4BAU] (archived Aug. 13, 2022).
25. See Daniel Kreps, Celeb Law Firm Refuses Hacker Ransom as Lady Gaga
Files Leak, ROLLING STONE (May 15, 2020), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/musicnews/lady-gaga-hack-1000092/ [https://perma.cc/PW2Y-LRNJ] (archived Aug. 13, 2022).
26. For the full segment, see John Oliver, Ransomware: Last Week Tonight, HBO
(Aug. 15, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WqD-ATqw3js [https://perma.cc/
8N64-UQTG] (archived Aug. 24, 2022).
27. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS, HOW TO PROTECT YOUR NETWORK FROM
RANSOMWARE 2 (July 14, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ransomwareprevention-and-response-for-cisos.pdf/view [https://perma.cc/5K63-2GLB] (archived
Aug. 24, 2022).
28. David Corchado, Why Ransomware Attacks Are on the Rise, INVESTIS DIGIT.
(May 19, 2021), https://www.investisdigital.com/blog/technology/why-ransomwareattacks-are-rise [https://perma.cc/QA88-USUH] (archived Aug. 24, 2022).
29. Id.
30. Ransomware Demands Continue to Rise as Data Exfiltration Becomes
Common,
and
Maze
Subdues,
COVEWARE
(Nov.
4,
2020),
https://www.coveware.com/blog/q3-2020-ransomware-marketplace-report
[https://perma.cc/4E87-R5QC] (archived Aug. 24, 2022).
31. See Corchado, supra note 28; see also SOPHOS, THE STATE OF RANSOMWARE
2021
3
(Apr.
2021),
https://secure2.sophos.com/enus/medialibrary/pdfs/whitepaper/sophos-state-of-ransomware-2021-wp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HY87-WTZK] (archived Aug. 24, 2022) (noting that on average in 2021
“only 65% of the encrypted data was restored after the ransom was paid” and that the
“average bill for rectifying a ransomware attack, considering downtime, people time,
device cost, network cost, lost opportunity, ransom paid etc. was US $1.85 million”).
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victims “around $265 billion (USD) annually . . . with a new attack (on
a consumer or business) every 2 seconds.”32
This Article offers an account of the regulatory challenges
associated with ransomware prevention. Situated within the broader
literature on underenforcement, Part I of this article explores the core
causes for the limited criminalization, prosecution, and international
cooperation that have exacerbated this wicked cybersecurity problem.
In particular, the Article examines the forensic, managerial,
jurisdictional, informational, and resource allocation challenges that
have plagued the fight against digital extortions in the global
commons.
To address these challenges, Part II of the Article makes the case
for the international criminalization of ransomware. Relying on
existing international regimes––namely, the 1979 Hostage Taking
Convention, the 2000 Convention Against Transnational Crime, and
the customary prohibitions against the crimes of Piracy and
Terrorism––the Article makes the claim that certain types of
ransomware attacks are already criminalized under existing
international law. In fact, the Article draws on each of these case
studies to portray the criminalization of ransomware as a “fourth
generation” in the outlawry of Hostis Humani Generis (enemies of
mankind).
Finally, Part III of the Article demonstrates the various
opportunities that could arise from treating ransomware gangs as
international criminals subject to universal jurisdiction. The Article
focuses on three immediate consequences that could arise from such
internationalization: (1) expanding policies for naming and shaming
harboring states, (2) authorizing extraterritorial cyber enforcement
and prosecution, and (3) advancing strategies for strengthening
cybersecurity at home.
II.

THE PROBLEM OF RANSOMWARE
A.

Defining Ransomware

Ransomware is a type of malware that targets data with the
intention of either rendering that data permanently inaccessible
through encryption or threatening further disclosure unless a ransom
is paid.33 The propagation methods of ransomware vary from

32. David Braue, Global Ransomware Damage Costs Predicted to Exceed $265
Billion
By
2031,
CYBERCRIME
MAG.
(June
2,
2022),
https://cybersecurityventures.com/global-ransomware-damage-costs-predicted-to-reach250-billion-usd-by-2031/ [https://perma.cc/7KEN-ANVK] (archived Aug. 24, 2022).
33. See Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Wannacry, Ransomware, and
the Emerging Threat to Corporations, 86 TENN. L. REV. 503, 505–06 (2019) (explaining
how the WannaCry virus “operates by encrypting a victim’s data and demanding
payment of a ransom in exchange for data recovery”).
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compromised mobile applications to infected websites or email
attachments.34 Of late, a significant number of attacks have taken
place via “remote desktop protocol . . . that do[es] not rely on any form
of user interaction.”35
The hackers typically demand payments in cryptocurrencies as
they are less regulated and harder to control using existing AntiMoney-Laundering laws.36 In particular, the application of “Know Your
Customer” and other “Customer Identification Procedures” is
complicated by the decentralization and anonymization associated
with these digital coins.37
Ransom attacks come with deadlines. “If the victim decides to
break the deadline, attackers either increase the price or delete the
decryption key.”38 Moreover, paying the ransom may not necessarily
end the operation. “Some programs also infect other devices on the
network, enabling further attacks. Other examples of ransomware also
infect victims with malware, such as Trojans that steal login
credentials.”39
According to British-based security software and hardware
company SOPHOS, “[i]n 2021, 46% of organizations that had data

34. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, CYBERSECURITY FOR SMALL BUSINESS:
RANSOMWARE,
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/ransomware/cybersecurity_sb_ransomwar
e.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2022) [https://perma.cc/8EB6-MBZU] (archived Aug. 24, 2022)
(detailing the various methods in which a criminal can start a ransomware attack).
35. Alexander S. Gillis & Ben Lutkevich, Definition: Ransomware, TECHTARGET,
https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/definition/ransomware (last visited Aug. 23,
2022) [https://perma.cc/JLZ8-56TG] (archived Aug. 24, 2022). Noting further that
attackers may use one of four different “approaches” in the conduct of their ransomware
operations: (1) “Encrypting Ransomware” is the classic “data kidnapping attack” where
the negotiations and digital currency extortion revolve around access to the encryption
keys to decrypt the data; (2) Screen Locking Ransomware involves locking users outside
of their computers, where unlocking will depend on the payment of ransom; (3) “Doxfare”
ransomware involves threatening to publish data unless ransom is paid; (4) “Scareware”
ransomware involves the generation of an endless cycle of pop-up notifications that
prevent access to the computer or its data. The only way to stop the generation of new
pop-ups is by the payment the ransom. Each of these four attack approaches can be
executed on mobile devices instead of regular computers. Id.
36. See generally VANSA CHATIKAVANIJ, MATTHEW DAVIE, JOSE FERNANDEZ DA
PONTE, BRAD GARLINGHOUSE, YUSUF HUSSAIN, PAUL MALEY & SEBASTIAN SERRANO,
WORLD ECON. F., NAVIGATING CRYPTOCURRENCY REGULATION: AN INDUSTRY
PERSPECTIVE ON THE INSIGHTS AND TOOLS NEEDED TO SHAPE BALANCED CRYPTO
REGULATION
(Sept.
2021),
https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Navigating_Cryptocurrency_Regulation_2021.pd
f [https://perma.cc/5MP9-BYVF] (archived Aug. 24, 2022).
37. See generally id.
38. Andreja Velimirovic, Ransomware Types and Examples, PHOENIXNAP (Jan.
13, 2021), https://phoenixnap.com/blog/ransomware-examples-types [https://perma.cc/
6EU7-JLWF] (archived Aug. 24, 2022).
39. Id.
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encrypted in a ransomware attack paid the ransom.”40 Of those who
paid, “11% of organizations said they paid ransoms of $1 million or
more.”41 Each of these payments helps fuel the criminal enterprise
behind ransomware, thereby inviting further attacks. The unfortunate
reality is that for each individual victim, payment makes financial
sense, even if that means off-loading costs and forcing negative effects
on society writ large.
Ransomware attacks are targeting every industry and walk of life,
from law firms to hospitals to academic institutions to insurance
companies to police departments. But ransomware is even a bigger
problem than that. Recently, ransomware gangs have begun targeting
private individuals and small mom-and-pop shops.42 In the words of
John Oliver, ransomware is now “so pervasive that it’s affecting
pipelines and grandmothers.”43 Generally speaking, hackers try to
focus their efforts on victims who share two common features: first,
they lack expertise and resources to ensure effective cybersecurity
hygiene; and second, they have inherent incentives to end business
interruptions quickly and bring operations back online.44
The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) noted in
its 2021 annual threat landscape report that “the frequency and the
complexity of ransomware increased . . . and became one of the greatest
threats that organisations face today regardless of the sector to which
they belong.”45 In fact, ENISA went further to suggest that we are now
living through the “golden era of ransomware,” that it “has become a
national security priority,” and that it has “not yet reached the peak of
its impact.”46

40. Sally Adam, The State of Ransomware 2022, SOPHOS NEWS (Apr. 27, 2021),
https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/04/27/the-state-of-ransomware-2022/ [https://perma
.cc/LZ6Y-RLRL] (archived Aug. 24, 2022). SOPHOS’s study is based on a survey of 5,600
IT professionals from 31 countries. Id.
41. Id.
42. See SOPHOS, THE STATE OF CONSUMER HOME CYBERSECURITY 2021 10 (July
2021), https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/pdfs/consumer/sophos-the-state-ofconsumer-home-cybersecurity-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/HN55-QUUZ] (archived Aug.
24, 2022) (noting that “nearly 1 in 5 consumers have firsthand experience with
ransomware” and that the majority of ransomware attacks targeting private individuals
occurred in the Northeast).
43. Oliver, supra note 26.
44. See generally Danny Palmer, Ransomware: Over Half of Attacks Are
Targeting
These
Three
Industries,
ZDNET
(Jan.
31,
2022),
https://www.zdnet.com/article/ransomware-over-half-of-attacks-are-targeting-thesethree-industries/
[https://perma.cc/3G
78-TK45] (archived Aug. 24, 2022) (noting that the banking, utilities, and retail
industries are particularly vulnerable, but that all industries are ultimately “at risk from
attacks”).
45. EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR CYBERSECURITY, ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE
2021: APRIL 2020–MID-JULY 2021 25 (Ifigeneia Lella et al. eds., 9th ed. 2021).
46. Id.
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Existing Regulation and its Limits

Considering this evolving threat environment, it is concerning to
realize just how fragmented and patchy global and domestic regulatory
responses have been so far. In this subpart I will examine both existing
domestic laws within the United States (the primary target of
ransomware attacks47) as well as public international law.
1.

Domestic Law

Within the limits of this Article, I am unable to offer a complete
account of all the domestic mechanisms within the United States to
regulate and enforce against ransomware. Instead, I wish to highlight
two key concerns: (a) patchy and nonuniform state legislation; and (b)
ad hoc and indecisive federal enforcement. Combined, these two factors
generate an environment within which ransomware gangs continue to
thrive.
a.

Patchy and Nonuniform State Legislation

A handful of states have adopted legislation that criminalizes
aspects of ransomware. For example, § 523 of the California Penal
Code makes it a punishable offence to “introduce ransomware into any
computer, computer system, or computer network” where the intent is
to “extort property or other consideration from another” and where
“such property or other consideration were actually obtained.”48
Compare the California statute with § 33.023 of the Texas Penal Code.
In Texas it is a crime if a person “introduces ransomware onto a
computer, computer network, or computer system through deception
and without a legitimate business purpose.”49 Notice the difference
between the two statutes. Whereas in Texas it is generally sufficient to
merely “introduce” the ransomware malware to a device, in California
the requirements are far more stringent, requiring both an “intent to

47. See Kate Birch, US and Canada Among Countries Most Attacked by
Ransomware, BUS. CHIEF (Nov. 15, 2021), https://businesschief.com/technology-andai/us-and-canada-among-countries-most-attacked-ransomware [https://perma.cc/UC2URG2D] (archived Aug. 24, 2022) (“Research by NordLocker has found the United States
is the leading country hit by ransomware attacks in 2020 and 2021, with Canada coming
third, behind the UK. The researchers looked at 1,200 companies targeted by 10 of the
leading ransomware gangs.”).
48. CAL. PENAL CODE § 523. The Law defines “ransomware” as “a computer
contaminant . . . or lock placed or introduced without authorization into a computer,
computer system, or computer network that restricts access by an authorized person to
the computer, computer system, computer network, or any data therein under
circumstances in which the person responsible for the placement or introduction of the
ransomware demands payment of money or other consideration to remove the computer
contaminant, restore access to the computer, computer system, computer network, or
data, or otherwise remediate the impact of the computer contaminant or lock.” Id.
49. TEX. CRIM. STAT. ANN. § 33.023.
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extort” and actual acquisition of “property or other consideration”
because of the extortion. These differences are significant as they
generate real gaps in the way the crimes are defined and could be
ultimately enforced across states.50
Moreover, all fifty states have data breach notification laws that
require the communication of data breach events to relevant state
supervisory authorities, and in certain cases to impacted consumers.
Reporting requirements, however, differ at the state level. The specific
terminology around what constitutes a triggering event could result in
ransomware attacks being excluded or included in the definition of a
data breach. This is especially true where the ransomware attack did
not involve the exfiltration of data or other forms of unauthorized
acquisition or access (recall that in traditional data encryption cases,
the hacker does not actually access or acquire the files, which remain
on the original computer; the hacker merely locks those files with an
encryption key).51
States are also the primary regulators of insurance law. So far,
only one state insurance regulator––New York––has attempted to
regulate cyber insurers on ransomware issues. On February 4, 2021,
the New York Department of Financial Services, led by
Superintendent Linda Lacewell, introduced the first state-wide cyber
insurance regulation in the United States.52 The circular had only one
specific requirement: that policyholders notify law enforcement for
ransomware attacks.53 As I have written elsewhere, however,

50. For other parallel legislation, see W. VA. CODE §§ 61-3C-3 to 61-3C-4; WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 6-3-506, 6-3-507.
51. Note, however, that at least in the context of Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) the U.S. Department Health & Human Services Office
for Civil Rights (“HHS OCR”) issued a guidance in 2016. “Specifically, HHS OCR
explained that when electronic protected health information (ePHI) is encrypted as the
result of a ransomware attack, a breach has occurred because the ePHI encrypted by the
ransomware was acquired (i.e., unauthorized individuals have taken possession or
control of the information).” Alan Brill, David White & Aravind Swaminathan, Does a
Ransomware Attack Constitute a Data Breach? Increasingly, It May, KROLL (Jan. 19,
2021),
https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/ransomware-attackconstitute-data-breach [https://perma.cc/BCH9-92PP] (archived Aug. 18, 2022).
52. See Letter from Linda A. Lacewell, Superintendent, N.Y. State: Dep’t Fin.
Servs., to all Authorized Property/Casualty Insurers (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.dfs.
ny.gov/industry_guidance/circular_letters/cl2021_02
[https://perma.cc/6VLW-4K76]
(archived Aug. 18, 2022).
53. For a view that questions the efficacy of cyber insurance regulation of
ransomware notifications and indemnification, see Erin Ayres, Banning Ransom
Payments a ‘Blunt, Potentially Ineffective’ Tool: Geneva Association, FPN ADVISEN (July
25, 2022), https://www.advisen.com/tools/fpnproc/fpns/articles_new_35/P/439958803.
html?rid=439958803&list_id=35 [https://perma.cc/CG38-E4NL] (archived Aug. 18, 2022)
(quoting the Geneva Association, the international association for the study of insurance
economics: “An outright ban on the payment of ransoms or their reimbursement by
re/insurers could backfire by driving transactions underground and encouraging
ransomware attackers to engage in new, more malicious forms of extortion . . . The
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one state regulator cannot tackle a collective action problem like this alone. The
race to the bottom will continue if, outside the state of New York, a failure to
notify will continue to be the norm. This is a matter better left to federal
regulation, not state. The circular is also silent as to the entity to be notified or
scope of notification. The reality is that the state is unable to actually enforce
disclosure to federal law enforcement, over which it has no authority, nor can it
be certain that the notification will be picked up and effectively handled once
transmitted. A notification policy is only as good as the enforcement action that
flows from it. As for local and state law enforcement, they are certainly in no
position to manage the threat of global cybercrime and cyberwarfare, thereby
highlighting the futility of notifying them.54

Finally, States are also split in the way that they regulate public
responses to ransomware attacks. North Carolina became the first
State to pass legislation banning the payment of ransom by public
entities, like state agencies, counties, and municipalities.55 North
Carolina further prohibited the act of negotiating with the hackers.56
Florida passed similar legislation outlawing ransom payments.57 But
whereas North Carolina includes public school districts and
universities in its list of public entities that are prohibited from paying
ransom, Florida’s law does not.58 Similarly, and unlike North Carolina,
Florida’s law does not prohibit communications with hackers.59 As
some practitioners have noted,
[m]ore laws of this kind may be on the horizon as Pennsylvania and New York
are considering similar mandates. Pennsylvania’s proposed legislation would
impose a tight time frame for agencies to report the ransomware attack to the
appropriate state officials within two hours and it would ban the use of taxpayer
money for ransomware payments, with the exception of certain circumstances
where payment is authorized by the governor. New York’s legislation, if enacted,
would prohibit ransomware payments by not only public agencies, but also
private companies.60

State ransomware criminalization laws, data breach notification
laws, cyber insurance regulations, and ransomware payment

absence of cyber insurance cover for extortion payments not only penalizes the insured,
but also does nothing to address the growth of [Ransomware-as-a-Service], which has
fueled ransomware attacks.”).
54. Asaf Lubin, Insuring Evolving Technology, 28(1) CONN. INS. L.J. 131, 161
(2021).
55. See Spencer Pollock & Kelly Campbell, North Carolina Bans State Entities
from Negotiating with Hackers - and Other States May Follow, MCDONALD HOPKINS
(June 9, 2022), https://mcdonaldhopkins.com/Insights/June-2022/NC-bans-negotiatingwith-hackers [https://perma.cc/S5AK-AYHY] (archived Aug. 18, 2022).
56. See id.
57. See State Cybersecurity Act, FLA. STAT. § 282.318 (amended 2022).
58. See Elise Elam & Benjamin Wanger, Florida Follows North Carolina in
Prohibiting State Agencies from Paying Ransom, BAKER HOSTETLER (July 19, 2022),
https://www.bakerdatacounsel.com/cybersecurity/florida-follows-north-carolina-inprohibiting-state-agencies-from-paying-ransoms/
[https://perma.cc/9C75-QQL7]
(archived Aug. 18, 2022).
59. See id.
60. Pollock & Campbell, supra note 55.
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prohibitions all vary drastically. Given that cyber harms and internet
crimes know no territorial bounds, this patchwork of conflicting state
responses has weakened the ability of the federal government and of
each state to effectively address threats and mitigate harms.
b.

Ad Hoc and Indecisive Federal Enforcement

The federal government has repeatedly recommended that
ransom should not be paid,61 and even warned of sanctions where
payments are done with knowledge of likely interference with
established sanctions set out by the Department of Treasury. 62 Yet, so
far, the government has not enforced sanctions against such payments,
even where local and state public entities were the ones behind the
payment.63 The FBI, for example, has treated the decision to pay the
ransom as a legitimate business decision, noting further that a ban on

61. See e.g., CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, PROTECTING
SENSITIVE AND PERSONAL INFORMATION FROM RANSOMWARE-CAUSED DATA BREACHES,
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CISA_Fact_SheetProtecting_Sensitive_and_Personal_Information_from_RansomwareCaused_Data_Breaches-508C.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2022) [https://perma.cc/2DU3DTP3] (archived Aug. 18, 2022) (noting that CISA “strongly discourages paying a ransom
to criminal actors. Paying a ransom may embolden adversaries to target additional
organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of
ransomware, and/or may fund illicit activities. Paying the ransom also does not
guarantee that a victim’s files will be recovered.”); see also David Bisson, Mayors Say
They’ll No Longer Pay Ransoms Connected to Security Events, TRIPWIRE (July 12, 2019),
https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/mayors-say-theyllno-longer-pay-ransoms-connected-to-security-events/
[https://perma.cc/BV9S-BB53]
(archived Aug. 18, 2022) (demonstrating that local government officials have also taken
the position to not make ransom payments). The official non-partisan organization of
cities with populations of at least 30,000 people has committed not to pay ransom in the
case of a ransomware event. Id.
62. See generally OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL (OFAC), U.S. D EP’T OF
TREASURY, UPDATED ADVISORY ON POTENTIAL SANCTIONS RISKS FOR FACILITATING
RANSOMWARE
PAYMENTS
(Sept.
21,
2021),
https://www.dwt.com//media/files/blogs/privacy-and-security-blog/2021/10/ofac-ransomware-sanctionsadvisory.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P2
DD-Z4W6] (archived Aug. 18, 2022). For an analysis of the limited impact that OFAC’s
Guidance has had on deterring payments, see Kyle D. Logue & Adam B. Shniderman,
The Case for Banning (and Mandating) Ransomware Insurance, 28(1) CONN. INS. L.J.
247 (2022); see also Michael T. Borgia & Dsu-Wei Yuen, OFAC Makes Waves in Fight
Against Ransomware, but Practical Effects Unclear, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (Oct.
1, 2021), https://www.dwt.com/blogs/privacy--security-law-blog/2021/10/ofac-updatedransomware-advisory [https://perma.cc/R6D4-SSN7] (archived Aug. 18, 2022).
63. See Logue & Shniderman, supra note 62, at 300–01. The authors describe
OFAC’s ban on payments as a “limited or contingent ban” that is “to date largely
unenforced.” The authors cite OFAC’s “discretion in deciding whom to seek penalties
against . . . [and] in deciding whether there has been a violation at all,” as one of the
reasons for the limited effects of the ban. Id.
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payments could have dramatic consequences.64 As one FBI official
noted in a statement to the US House Judiciary Committee, “if a
company chooses to pay and they have now broken the law, then a
cyber adversary has the ability to hold them accountable in the public’s
eye and threaten them even more with a higher extortion.”65
This sends mixed signals to the public and harms the ability to
reduce the total amount of payments paid.66 Moreover, due to the scale
of harm, government is only able to respond to a fraction of actual
cases, disincentivizing the public from communicating with law
enforcement altogether.67
This is not to suggest that there haven’t been successes. The new
Department of Justice (DOJ) Digital Extortion task force has taken
some noticeable public action. For example, in June 2021, the DOJ
seized $2.3 million in cryptocurrency paid to the ransomware
extortionists Darkside, and, in November 2021, the DOJ seized an
additional $6 million in ransom payments to a pair of Russian and
Ukrainian nationals who were behind the REvil ransomware. 68 Some
praised what they called “coordinated anti-ransomware” by the federal
government, which has in the latter part of 2021 produced evidence of
“ransom payments clawed back, decryption keys obtained,

64. See Erin Ayers, Banning Ransom Payments Would Worsen Extortion: FBI
Official,
FPN
ADVISEN
(Apr.
4,
2022),
https://www.advisen.com/tools/fpnproc/fpns/articles_new_35/P/427646848.html?rid=427
646848&list_id=35
[https://perma.cc/63UV-PE
Z2] (archived Aug. 18, 2022).
65. Id.
66. Most recently in the wake of the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack, Anne
Neuberger, the Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber & Emerging Technologies,
recognized that victims of ransomware “often face a very difficult situation, and they
have to just balance the cost benefit when they have no choice with regards to paying a
ransom.” It therefore did not condemn the Colonial Pipeline decision to pay $5 million
ransom one day after being hit with the attack. See Press Briefing by Jen Psaki, Press
Secretary, Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, Homeland Security Advisor and Deputy
National Security Advisor & Anne Neuberger, Deputy National Security Advisor for
Cyber
and
Emerging
Technologies,
WHITE HOUSE
(May
10,
2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/05/10/press-briefing-bypress-secretary-jen-psaki-homeland-security-advisor-and-deputy-national-securityadvisor-dr-elizabeth-sherwood-randall-and-deputy-national-security-advisor-for-cyberand-emerging/ [https://perma.cc/W2AH-35PU] (archived Aug. 18, 2022).
67. See SIMON HANDLER, EMMA SCHROEDER, FRANCES SCHROEDER & TREY HERR,
ATL. COUNCIL, COUNTERING RANSOMWARE: LESSONS FROM AIRCRAFT HIJACKING 10
(Aug. 26, 2021), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/IBRANSOMWARE-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6AU-6TW7] (archived Aug. 18, 2022)
(“Ransomware payments cannot be considered in the binary—to ban or not to ban—
because that action alone is both insufficient and potentially harmful. What is needed is
to change the incentive structure of those targeted by ransomware, giving them more
realistic alternatives.”).
68. See Rob Legare, Nicole Sganga & Jeff Pegues, U.S. Seizes Over $6 Million
from Ransomware Attacks, CBS NEWS (Nov. 8, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
ransomware-attacks-united-states-6-million/ [https://perma.cc/8QEX-T79B] (archived
Aug. 18, 2022).
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communications infiltrated, [and] successful multi-national law
enforcement efforts.”69
The federal government has also relied on extraditions as a tool to
bring cyber criminals to justice for ransomware attacks and related
money-laundering. Relying on charges of wire fraud, access device
fraud, and computer fraud, the government has been successful in
reaching foreign hackers.70 Maksim Berezan, for example, was
extradited to the United States from Latvia and pleaded guilty to such
charges in April 2021, after committing ransomware attacks “causing
over $53 million in losses.”71
Yet despite these examples and the general optimism associated
with it, many acknowledge that “the sheer volume of attacks means a
handful of prosecutions is unlikely to make a difference” as “the scheme
is still too lucrative for criminals to give up.”72 Indeed, as one
cybersecurity researcher noted, ransomware gangs “learn from others’
mistakes and improve their [operational security]” since ultimately,
even as government works to shut them down, “they are here to stay.”73
Against this backdrop of uncertain federal action and growing
ransomware threats, private entities have begun to play a far more
expansive role. Cybersecurity firms now offer ransomware negotiation
services, and cyber commercial insurers connect victims to those firms
as well as to data restoration and to PR companies, with the goal of
reducing the total cost of each attack.74 In other words, instead of

69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Conspiracy to Commit Access Device Fraud and Computer
Intrusions, 18 U.S.C. § 371; Access Device Fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1029; Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030; Wire Fraud Affecting Financial Institutions, 18 U.S.C. §
1343; Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud Affecting Financial Institutions, 18 U.S.C. §
1349.
71.
Cybercriminal Connected to Multimillion Dollar Ransomware Attacks
Sentenced for Online Fraud Schemes, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 25, 2022),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/cybercriminal-connected-multimillion-dollarransomware-attacks-sentenced-online-fraud [https://perma.cc/BU9N-8PBS] (archived
Oct. 10, 2022); For another example, consider Alleged Russian Cryptocurrency Money
Launderer Extradited to United States, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Aug. 5, 2022),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alleged-russian-cryptocurrency-money-laundererextradited-united-states [https://perma.cc/C6LW-BPKZ] (archived Oct. 10, 2022)
(describing a “defendant extradited from Greece to face charges stemming from the
operation of BTC-e, an illicit bitcoin exchange alleged to have received deposits valued
at over $4 billion.” The BTC-e bitcoin exchange was utilized in many ransomware
attacks).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See generally Zoe Kleinman, Insurers Defend Covering Ransomware
Payments, BBC (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-55811165
[https://perma.cc/N5SJ-FYUM] (archived Aug. 18, 2022) (explaining that insurers are
now covering ransomware payments); Rachel Monroe, How to Negotiate with
Ransomware
Hackers,
NEW
YORKER
(Mar.
31,
2021),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/06/07/how-to-negotiate-with-ransomwarehackers
[https://perma.cc/HZ6W-3L
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working with law enforcement, the ineffectiveness of responses at the
state and federal levels has generated new private markets for
ransomware mitigation. These markets thrive on keeping the
ransomware threat alive. They are not interested in its complete
eradication, nor does their business model endorse a close partnership
with state and federal agencies.
2.

International Law

At the international level, primary principles and doctrines of
international law—such as the rules concerning sovereignty, nonintervention, and the prohibition on the use of force—do not introduce
meaningful prohibitions on ransomware attacks. This is because,
under international law, there are high thresholds for a violation of
any of these rules, and most criminal ransomware activities fall short
of meeting those thresholds.
Most ransomware attacks do not constitute uses of force as defined
under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. To constitute a use
of force, a cyberattack must, by its “scale and effects,” be comparable
to a non-cyber kinetic use of force.75 In other words, a cyberattack
needs to parallel, in its scope and consequences, the kind of harms that
may be generated by physical uses of force. Yet, most ransomware
attacks only generate economic harms and thereby produce limited
effects.
Similarly, most ransomware attacks do not violate the customary
prohibition on intervention. The International Court of Justice
Nicaragua decision defined an unlawful intervention as one that bears
on “matters in which each State is permitted . . . to decide freely,”76
such as “the choice of a political, economic, social, and cultural system,
and the formulation of foreign policy.”77 This first element is often
referred to as the domaine réservé requirement (the “reserved domain”
of core areas of state activity). Second, Nicaragua confirms that a state
must be coerced to take the otherwise undesired choice.78 Only coerced
interventions are prohibited under the doctrine.
Ransomware attacks rarely constitute coercive intrusions into the
domaine réservé of the state in which the target of the attack resides.
Note that in the course of most ransomware operations, the targets are
private individuals and companies, and no state is ever forced to act

JS] (archived Aug. 18, 2022). But cf. Carolyn Cohn, Insurers Run from Ransomware
Cover
as
Losses
Mount,
REUTERS
(Nov.
19,
2021),
https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/insurers-run-ransomware-cover-lossesmount-2021-11-19/
[https://perma.cc/UH
7G-AVAJ] (archived Aug. 18, 2022).
75. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27).
76. Id. ¶ 205.
77. Id.
78. See id.
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“in an involuntary manner” or denied action it otherwise would have
taken.79 Even when the target is a public entity (say a police
department or a public school), and where that entity is compelled to
pay the ransom, such payment still falls short of a coercive intervention
as the decision to pay is not one that may be said to fall within the
domaine réservé. The ransomware will need to cause a disruption to
political, social, or economic life with significant and direct
consequences. Short of that, the intrusion on the state and the society
is contained and limited and thereby does not rise to the level of an
intervention.
As far as sovereignty is concerned, for ransomware to constitute
an internationally wrongful act, it will first need to be attributable to
a state with sufficient evidence (a challenge in and of itself).80 After all,
most ransomware gangs are criminal gangs and not organs of the state.
The nexus between these gangs and the countries in which they
operate is often ambiguous and hardly meets the strict tests of
“direction and control” or “endorsement and acknowledgement” to
result in effective attribution.81
Even more troubling, states fail to agree on the exact scope of
application of sovereign equality in cyberspace, and, as such, the
doctrine is unlikely to offer a meaningful constraint to ransomware
currently. As summarized by Lieutenant Colonel Visger,
[b]y electing to treat sovereignty as a principle rather than as a substantive rule,
the U.K. maintains that violations of sovereignty do not, on their own, constitute
violations of international law. This position touched off the well-known debate
surrounding sovereignty, with most states rejecting the U.K.’s position and

79. NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 317 (2d ed. 2017) [hereinafter
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0].
80. See generally Kristen Eichensehr, The Law & Politics of Cyberattack
Attribution, 67 UCLA L. REV. 520 (2020); see also JOHN SAKELLARIADIS, ATL. COUNCIL,
ISSUE
BRIEF:
BEHIND
THE
RISE
OF
RANSOMWARE
8
(2022),
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-sedcontent/uploads/2022/08/Behind-the-Rise-ofRansomware.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CM
6D-R5G2] (archived Aug. 10, 2022) (“[T]he fluidity, decentralization, and dynamism of
the digital extortion market complicate the process of identifying individual ransomware
actors. The relationships that characterize each ransomware group fluctuate constantly,
with individuals moving between ransomware gangs, gangs purchasing tools and
services from other criminals, and various groups contributing to different elements of
an attack. The resulting complexity means that ‘it is often difficult to identify
conclusively the actors behind a ransomware incident,’ as cybersecurity authorities in
the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom recently observed.”).
81. See G.A. Res. 56/83, ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, arts. 2, 8, 11 (Dec. 12, 2001).
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concluding that a violation of sovereignty in fact violates a state’s international
law obligations.82

Even if sovereignty was determined to be a standalone rule that
may be violated, whether ransomware is a good candidate for such a
violation is subject to skepticism. Are the actions of encrypting and
demanding ransom, when conducted remotely over the internet,
constitutive of a breach of territorial sovereignty? Do these acts
interfere with or usurp inherently governmental functions? Do they
cause physical damage, injury, or loss of functionality of the kind that
could be said to trigger a sovereignty violation?83 These are all hard
questions of interpretation and application that lack international
consensus.
Overall, the international legal rules governing cyberspace are
“nascent and evolving.”84 So far, states have not been willing to forego
their own “freedom of action through the adoption or advancement of
specific international law rules” that could constrain ransomware
activity.85 States prefer to operate in a seemingly lawless space for
cyber activity, where every offensive and defensive action is presumed
lawful, even if the consequence of that is the inability to regulate the
use of these tools by adversaries to harm.
Even to the extent that the prohibition on the use of force, the
prohibition on intervention, or the rules on sovereignty may be said to
apply to a small group of particularly harmful and dramatic
ransomware attacks, that would not be enough to address the overall
issue. The majority of ransomware will remain outside of the scope of
international regulation.
The same can also be said for certain tailored norms to regulate
particularly heinous ransomware attacks. For example, some have
proposed that a more limited rule may be said to evolve around
banning ransomware attacks against critical infrastructure. The UN
Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) adopted the norm that “[a]
State should not conduct or knowingly support [information and
communications technology] activity contrary to its obligations under
international law that intentionally damages critical infrastructure or
otherwise impairs the use and operation of critical infrastructure to

82. Mark Visger, The International Law Sovereignty Debate and Development of
International Norms on Peacetime Cyber Operations, LAWFARE (July 12, 2022),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/international-law-sovereignty-debate-and-developmentinternational-norms-peacetime-cyber-operations
[https://perma.cc/NMT7-6D5Q]
(archived Aug. 10, 2022).
83. These questions are based on the Tallinn Manual’s proposed tests for a
sovereignty violation. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 79, at 20–21.
84. Gary Corn, International Law’s Role in Combating Ransomware?, JUST SEC.
(Aug.
23,
2021),
https://www.justsecurity.org/77845/international-laws-role-incombating-ransomware/ [https://perma.cc/5DBZ-Y5R5] (archived Aug. 10, 2022).
85. Id.
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provide services to the public.”86 When President Biden met with
President Putin in Geneva in June 2021, he gave Putin a list of sixteen
critical infrastructure entities that were “off limits” to Russian
cyberattacks.87 In so doing, the administration certainly echoed the
UNGGE report. At the same time, however, the policy does not
constitute a complete ban of ransomware. By saying that certain
ransomware attacks were “off limits,” the reverse would also be true,
that the other ransomware attacks are “within bounds” and tolerable.
That is a grotesque reality and one that only serves to further cement
the practice of ransomware across most industries and against most
victims.
A similar approach was taken by the Oxford Statement on the
Regulation of Ransomware Operations.88 The statement, produced by
international legal experts under the auspices of the Oxford Institute
for Ethics, Law & Armed Conflict, notes that “there is no space for
ransomware in a healthy, peaceful, and prosperous international
community.”89 At the same time, the statement stops short of
outlawing ransomware ipso facto as malum in se (evil in itself by that
very fact). Instead, much like the Biden administration, the statement
prohibits only those ransomware attacks that “result in violations of
human rights,” “amount to a prohibited threat or use of force,” “violate
the principles of sovereignty or non-intervention,” or “are contrary to
the rights of other States.”90 In other words, it is not the act of
ransomware that by itself results in an illegality; instead the
wrongfulness of the ransomware is determined by its nature, scale, and
consequences on a case-by-case basis (taking into account various
general principles of international law).91
In conclusion, even the most expansive interpretations of existing
international law generate a patchwork of norms that, at best, could

86. Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security,
transmitted by Letter dated 26 June 2015 from the Secretary-General to the General
Assembly, 8, U.N. Doc. A/70/174 (July 22, 2015).
87. Morgan Phillips, Biden Gave Putin List of 16 Critical Infrastructure Entities
‘Off
Limits’
to
Cyberattacks,
FOX
BUS.
(June
16,
2021),
https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/biden-putin-critical-infrastructure-entities-offlimits-cyberattacks
[https://perma.
cc/F3BY-LQE7] (archived Aug. 12, 2022).
88. Full disclosure, the author was involved in the drafting of the statement and
ultimately signed it once published, though disagreed with the drafters on its language.
89. Dapo Akande, Antonio Coco, Talita de Souza Dias, Duncan B. Hollis, James
C. O’Brien & Tsvetelina van Benthem, Oxford Statement on International Law
Protections in Cyberspace: The Regulation of Ransomware Operations, JUST SEC. (Oct. 4,
2021),
https://www.justsecurity.org/78457/oxford-statement-on-international-lawprotections-in-cyberspace-the-regulation-of-ransomware-operations/
[https://perma.cc/ZUJ7-UGXH] (archived Aug. 12, 2022).
90. Id.
91. See id. Ultimately, the Oxford Statement puts forward merely a “vision” and
calls on States to “fully commit” to that vision. States have yet to have done so publicly,
leaving international law on ransomware in a vague and peculiar position.
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be said to constrain a handful of severe ransomware attacks while
leaving the rest untouched and unconstrained.
C.

The Causes of Ransomware Underenforcement

This subpart will explain the root causes for ransomware
underenforcement under both domestic and international law. This
subpart builds on Peter Swire’s excellent theoretical mapping in his
2009 article “No Cop on the Beat.”92 For the purposes of this subpart, I
define underenforcement as a situation involving “a weak state
response to lawbreaking as well as to victimization.”93 I conclude that
there are five primary causes that generate an underenforcement
“wicked problem” for ransomware:94 (1) information asymmetries, (2)
clashing jurisdictions, (3) the tragedy of the commons, (4) managerial
deficits, and (5) forensic and diplomatic challenges.
To provide context for each of the five challenges this paper will
rely on a typical ransomware scenario: Ransomware Gang R1 is located
in Country R and conducts operations against local business in
countries V and H. Victims V1, V2, V3 and H1, H2, H3 all suffer
significant business interruption and loss of revenue. V1 and H1 both
have a cyber insurance policy provided by VI and HI respectively. The
law enforcement agencies in V and H (VLE and HLE) are charged with
the mandate of preventing and mitigating cybercrime.
1.

Information Asymmetries

There are currently no obligations to share information about
ransomware under domestic law across multiple information sharing
lines. Victims are not required to share information with one another
either domestically (V1 to V2) or internationally (V1 to H1); V1 is not
required to share information with V2 (let alone H1). Similarly, victims
have no obligation to share information with law enforcement either
domestically (V1 to VLE) or internationally (V1 to HLE).95 If the

92. See generally Peter P. Swire, No Cop on the Beat: Underenforcement in ECommerce and Cybercrime, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 107 (2009) (discussing the
difficulty of determining “definite and objective answers” to and descriptions of social
and policy problems, namely the enforcement of “e-commerce, cybercrime and Internet
harms”).
93. Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1717
(2006).
94. See Horst W. J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of
Planning, 4 POL’Y SCIS. 155, 160–61 (1973) (describing the concept of “wicked problems.”
These are public policy problems that, unlike problems in math or chess, avoid
straightforward articulation and deny simple or final solutions.).
95. A recent exception is the “Strengthening American Cybersecurity Act of 2022”
which was passed in March 2022. S. 3600, 117th. Cong. (2022). The new legislation
requires organizations deemed to operate critical infrastructure “must report
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insurance policy is triggered, insurers are similarly not required to
share information with other insurers again (say between VI and HI),
nor with any law enforcement agency for that matter.96
As Peter Swire notes in the context of cyber harms, when “the
enforcement agency receives a complaint, there is no basis for knowing
whether the perpetrator has harmed one victim (the local complainant)
or numerous victims (who live predominantly in other jurisdictions).”97
Moreover, the lack of reporting obligations and information sharing
means that the broader national security community, including law
enforcement agencies, is “unable to exploit the full range of capabilities
and expertise” in their counter ransomware efforts.98
2.

Clashing Jurisdiction99

Our perpetrators in the scenario are a gang of hackers located in
country R far away from the victims (who are located in V and H). This
generates geopolitical considerations that enhance the enforcement
gap. As Bátrla and Harašta write,
[r]ansomware attacks were predominantly aimed at North American and
European targets. Multiple sources described most ransomware attacks as
originating from cybercriminals in Russia and other commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) countries – 15 of the 25 most important ransomware
groups in mid-2021 were believed to be based there . . . Evidence suggests that
these countries were unwilling to intervene as long as threat actors followed

ransomware payments within 24 hours” to CISA and must report any other cyber-attack
“within 72 hours.” Graham Cluley, US Legislation Brings Mandatory Cyberattack and
Ransomware
Reporting
One
Step
Closer,
TRIPWIRE
(Mar.
3,
2022),
https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/government/us-legislation-bringsmandatory-cyberattack-and-ransomware-reporting-one-step-closer/
[https://perma.cc/4JTF-WV5U] (archived Aug. 12, 2022). Notice, however, that this
reaffirms the structure discussed above of sectoral protections for critical infrastructure,
while no protections or obligations beyond critical infrastructure. For further analysis,
see id. Another exception includes the above discussed state regulation of public
responses to ransomware. Indeed North Carolina and Florida, both demand notification
to state authorities and/or law enforcement whenever a ransomware attack takes place
against state public entities. See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text.
96. Recall the discussion above about the New York State Cyber Insurance
regulation as one possible exception. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
97. Swire, supra note 92, at 111.
98. S. REP. NO. 107-351, at 77 (2002) (explaining that, as the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence noted, dealing with transnational threats “requires close
coordination and information sharing among and within the Intelligence Community
agencies”).
99. Parts of this Section repeat analysis that I have argued elsewhere in Asaf
Lubin, The Prohibition on Extraterritorial Enforcement Jurisdiction in the Datasphere,
in HANDBOOK ON EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (Austen L. Parrish &
Cedric Ryngaert eds., forthcoming 2022).
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basic precautions regarding local targets or helped state intelligence and [Law
Enforcement Agencies].100

When a country provides shelter to ransomware gangs and refuses
to take enforcement action against them, that country abuses the
sovereign privileges it enjoys. In other words, the act of sheltering is
an act of extending jurisdictional protections to shield criminals from
enforcement actions taken by victim states.101 International law is
agnostic to the way sovereigns use (and misuse) these privileges. As
was articulated by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the
Lotus case in 1927: “[T]he first and foremost restriction imposed by
international law upon a State is that—failing the existence of a
permissive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in any
form in the territory of another State.”102
Applying the Lotus case, the “most solid view” of international law
is that any non-consensual access to data by a law enforcement agency
that is “stored on a server located in the territory of another state
constitutes a breach of the territorial integrity of that state.” 103 This
view of the law has been endorsed by courts,104 governments,105

100. Michael Bátrla & Jakub Harašta, Releasing the Hounds? Disruption of the
Ransomware Ecosystem Through Offensive Cyber Operations, in 14TH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON C YBER CONFLICT: KEEP MOVING 93, 99 (2022) (listing CIS countries as
including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,
Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan).
101. See SAKELLARIADIS, supra note 80, at 9 (“Russian noncompliance with
transnational cybercrime investigations exacerbates the natural hurdles involved in
transnational law enforcement. For more than a decade, major cybercriminal networks
have operated with impunity out of Russia. Mounting evidence suggests that many of
these criminals purchase their immunity through cooperation with Russian intelligence
and law enforcement agencies.”).
102. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18
(emphasis added).
103. Bert-Jaap Koops & Morag Goodwin, Cyberspace, the Cloud and Cross-Border
Criminal Investigation. The Limits and Possibilities of International Law 61 (Tilburg L.
Sch. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 05/2016, 2014). In fact, the
authors cite to a US attorneys manual to demonstrate that even more innocuous acts of
remote evidence-gathering, like making a phone call or sending a letter, could be
“considered a breach of sovereignty.” Id.
104. See, e.g., X, Re (2009), 2009 F.C. 1058, para. 40 (Can. Fed. Ct.); Weber &
Saravia v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 1, 88 (2006).
105. A 2013 study by the UN Office of Drugs and Crime summarized the opinions
of forty-seven responding states on a range of cybercrime issues. Two-thirds of the
responders concluded that it would be “not permissible” for foreign law enforcement to
“access computer systems or data” without relying on formal mechanisms for affirming
consent, like an MLA process. Those countries explicitly cited “the principle of
sovereignty” to justify their position. See U.N. OFF. DRUGS & CRIME, COMPREHENSIVE
STUDY ON CYBERCRIME 220 (Feb. 2013) https://www.unodc.org/documents/organizedcrime/UNODC_CCPCJ_EG.4_2013/CYBERCRIME_STUDY_210213.pdf [https://perma
.cc/JA2E-CUZY] (archived Aug. 14, 2022).
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scholars,106 and certain treaty regimes.107 The logic behind this
interpretation is quite clear: “It is universally recognized, as a corollary
of state sovereignty, that officials of one state may not exercise their
functions in the territory of another state without the latter’s
consent.”108
As a result of this, countries are constrained under doctrinal,
positivist, and formalist views of international law from engaging in
unilateral non-consensual cross-border cyber enforcement operations
(including certain operations to seize cryptocurrency or unmask the
location and identities of the ransomware gang members).109 This
includes the use of offensive cyber operations to disrupt the
ransomware ecosystem (e.g., hacking back to servers and devices,
collecting intelligence, and interfering with certain ransomware
networks). At least one group of scholars believes that these operations
have real-life impacts as they hit the bottom line of the ransomware
groups by “imposing infrastructure recovery, internal security costs,
loss of reputation, and even increased stress on members, staff
dismissals, and groups disbanding altogether.”110
As all extraterritorial cyber enforcement actions are deemed
illegal and a violation of international law under existing doctrinal
understanding, then victim states are simply left paralyzed. The

106. See, e.g., Robert J. Currie, Cross-Border Evidence Gathering in Transnational
Criminal Investigation: Is the Microsoft Ireland Case the “Next Frontier”?, 54 CAN. Y.B.
INT’L. L. 1, 51 (2016) (concluding that, for the time being, states are still committed to a
“Westphalian-bound model” that prohibits extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction in
cyberspace); Joachim Zekoll, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, in BEYOND TERRITORIALITY:
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 341, 369 (Gunther
Handl et al. eds., 2012) (“Disputes arising out of Internet activities are, for the most part,
governed by traditional, state-based jurisdictional forces.”); Kevin Jon Heller, In Defense
of Pure Sovereignty in Cyberspace, 97 INT’L L. STUD. 1432, 1464 (2021) (“[L]ow-intensity
law-enforcement operations violate sovereignty simply because they involve penetrating
a computer system located on the territory of another State.”); Stephen Allen, Enforcing
Criminal Jurisdiction in the Clouds and International Law’s Enduring Commitment to
Territoriality, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 381,
409 (Stephen Allen et al. eds., 2019) (noting that “unilateral retrieval of data located
within another state’s territory” is in “contravention of international law,” and further
suggesting that any attempt to “bypass the territorial conception of enforcement
jurisdiction by reference to exceptional grounds” is “unsustainable”).
107. The leading cybercrime treaty, the Council of Europe Convention on
Cybercrime (or Budapest Convention) prohibits non-consensual transborder access to
computer data, except in very limited scenarios. See Convention on Cybercrime art. 32,
Nov. 23, 2001, 185 E.T.S. (entered into force July 1, 2004) [hereinafter Budapest
Convention]. Note, however, that Article 39(3) confirms that the Convention does not
affect other rights or restrictions, thereby opening the door for parallel evolution of
customary practice around extraterritorial enforcement in cyberspace. See id. art. 39(3).
108. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 432, cmt. b (AM. L.
INST. 1987) (suggesting further that the offended state may be entitled to seek certain
reparation).
109. See Heller, supra note 103, at 1468 (“[A]ny remote penetration of a computer
system, even penetration that does not cause any harm, violates the territorial
sovereignty of the State in which the computer system is located.”).
110. Bátrla & Harašta, supra note 100, at 114.
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harboring state may continue to harbor with impunity, and societies
are forced to burden the cost of continued crime.111
3.

The Tragedy of the Commons

In social sciences Garratt Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons”
refers to a situation where individual users acting independently from
one another operate solely on the basis of their personal interest
against the common good. As was already suggested, given the
magnitude of the ransomware problem, no one local entity can take
this challenge alone. With limited prosecutorial resources, and where
most victims and perpetrators are outside one’s own jurisdiction, it is
easy for enforcement agencies to kick the can down the road and drag
their feet, hoping someone else will address the problem.112 The shared
resource of cyberspace is thus progressively polluted with hackers
engaging in ransomware, with no one willing to invest in bringing an
end to this menace. Peter Swire has demonstrated how the “someone
else’s problem” issue manifests in cyber enforcement cases to generate
a commons problem:
Prosecuting the distant perpetrator will also be less of a priority as a matter of
public choice—the enforcer will presumably get more credit locally when all of
the victims are local, rather than bringing a case against a perpetrator who
mostly harms individuals outside of the jurisdiction. Where enforcement is
spread across many local jurisdictions, we thus would expect a classic commons
effect: Rational local enforcers will focus on local effects, leading to
underenforcement for the system as a whole.113

4.

Managerial Deficits

Most law enforcement agencies lack the necessary personnel,
administrative, and technical resources needed to respond to the
ransomware challenge. I call this a “managerial deficit.”
The last few years in ransomware operations saw the development
of a business model centered around “ransomware-as-a-service”

111. See id. at 99.
112. See Cameron Bertron, Answering the Call: Improving Local Police Response
to
Ransomware,
ALL.
FOR
SECURING DEMOCRACY (Jan.
14,
2022),
https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/answering-the-call-improving-local-policeresponse-to-ransomware/ [https://perma.cc/VE75-TJJB] (archived Aug. 16, 2022)
(describing a study in which researchers “called local police in the most populous city in
all 50 states” asking for information about how to respond to a ransomware incident. The
research indicated that “most local agencies do not have a clear or codified response
strategy to ransomware . . . Overall, the responses seemed improvised and erratic. These
results point to a lack of clarity and communication at higher levels of law enforcement
as to who deals with ransomware and cybercrime more broadly. Responses are bound to
remain inconsistent in the absence of direct guidelines for operators and officers.
Without a clear chain of command for ransomware cases, both local law enforcement and
victims are in the dark.”).
113. Swire, supra note 92, at 113.
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(RaaS).114 RaaS is an established industry within the ransomware
business, in which operators “will lease out or offer subscriptions to
their malware creations to others for a price––whether this is a per
month deal or a cut of any successful extortion payments.”115 RaaS
allows for increasing the scale of crime. Hackers do not need to develop
their own criminal platforms anymore. They can merely purchase
minutes on existing RaaS platforms to target hundreds of victims at
once, knowing that at least some will pay.116 This is combined with
underground forums on the DarkNet. These forums help “lower the
entry bar” and provide “social and market infrastructure for
cybercrime communities, including advertising, sales of initial
accesses, recruitment and exchange of information, intrusion tools, and
expertise.”117 Unlike the use of private messaging apps, these forums
allow for “scale, accessibility, inherent trust, and reputation
mechanisms, such as limited or invite-only access, escrow services,
‘karma’ systems based on activity (e.g., number of posts, transactions,
cryptocurrencies deposited) or user recommendations.”118
Considering the lucrative nature of RaaS and the difficulty of
tracking down and prosecuting operators, it should come as no surprise
that law enforcement is facing a scalability problem. VLE and HLE, in
our hypothetical story, do not have the necessary resources to
simultaneously address hundreds of crimes all happening at once. So,
while crime has scaled up, responses to it have not.119 As a result, often
victims call law enforcement and get only limited and partial
assistance to their problems.120 They are therefore not incentivized to

114. CONG. RSCH. SERV., RANSOMWARE AND FEDERAL LAW: CYBERCRIME AND
CYBERSECURITY 5 (2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46932 [https://
perma.cc/5TP5-T3DU] (archived Aug. 16, 2022).
115. Charlie Osborne, Ransomware in 2022: We’re All Screwed, ZDNET (Dec. 22,
2021), https://www.zdnet.com/article/ransomware-in-2022-were-all-screwed/ [https://
perma.cc/2ZX3-P8HT] (archived Aug. 16, 2022).
116. See SAKELLARIADIS, supra note 80, at 6 (“Increasing specialization across
different stages of the ransomware life cycle also is evident in the growth of the
ransomware-as-a-service model (RaaS). In a RaaS structure, a core group of criminals
manage a ransomware payload, while outsourcing ransomware deployment to so-called
‘affiliates.’ The model has the dual benefit of allowing ransomware groups to scale their
operation and to off-load risk, with affiliates now drawing increasing attention from law
enforcement. According to an interview given by a member of the REvil ransomware
gang, the group at one point had sixty affiliates carrying out attacks on its behalf. As of
October 2021, eight of the ten leading ransomware groups employed an affiliate model
to carry out attacks.”).
117. Bátrla & Harašta, supra note 100, at 98.
118. Id.
119. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
120. Id. In fact, as part of the study multiple police departments “were unsure of
their answer or googled what the police response should be” when confronted with a
phone call asking for advice in the wake of a ransomware incident. An additional group
of law enforcement first responders didn’t even know what ransomware was. One agent
went as far as to suggest that “ransomware was not a matter for law enforcement.” Id.
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communicate with law enforcement in the future––enhancing the
informational asymmetry even further.
5.

Forensic and Diplomatic Challenges

Challenges in evidence gathering, attribution issues, and the
varying degrees of technological sophistication and literacy possessed
by law enforcement have also complicated the ability to respond to this
crime effectively. The duality of this threat––having the appearance of
a national security problem (that can only be addressed by national
security authorities and frameworks) but having local impacts as a
domestic crime––is what makes this a unique threat.
This is not the first time that the United States faces a threat that
blurs the line between national security and domestic crime. Consider,
for example, the long period during the 1980s of kidnappings of CEOs
of American companies in Latin-America. Ed Meese, then the Attorney
General of the United States, was considering a ban on kidnapping and
ransom insurance as some argued that the “presence of insurance
actually increases the probability of kidnapping.”121 Ultimately, Meese
decided not to ban the program, as he worried that a ban would
disincentivize “contact with law enforcement.”122 This is because
indemnification under the policies depended on notification to the FBI.
In fact, insurers turned to the FBI to negotiate with the kidnappers
and diplomatically work with the relevant foreign countries to ensure
the safe release of the kidnapped.123 In other words, the forensic and
diplomatic challenges meant that victims and insurers were
encouraged to work with law enforcement to resolve these crises.
The ransomware problem is one that no longer mandates that
victims and their insurers go through the government. Whereas
physical kidnappings mandated inter-governmental coordination to
assist in the release and recovery efforts, when everything is digital,
and all that is kidnapped is data, there is no physical element that
necessitates the role of government for crisis management. Into this
fray enter private security start-ups led by former US intelligence and
cyber professionals, who bring with them the same national security
expertise that was once within the complete monopoly of the
government.124 The result is that insurance policies no longer demand

121. Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, The Paradox of Insurance, FAC.
SCHOLARSHIP
AT
PENN
CAREY
L.
1,
5
(2020),
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3160&context=faculty_sc
holarship [https://perma.cc/C9V5-L92P] (archived Aug. 16, 2022).
122. Richard J. Aldrich & Lewis Herrington, Secrets, Hostages and Ransoms:
British Kidnap Policy in Historical Perspective, 44(4) REV. INT’L STUD. 738, 756 (2018).
123. See id.
124. See Richard Byrne Reilly, Born in the NSA!, VENTURE BEAT (May 1, 2014),
https://venturebeat.com/2014/05/01/born-in-the-nsa-former-spies-are-starting-
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notification to law enforcement or collaboration with the government,
further exacerbating the informational asymmetries discussed above.
V1 and VI can work together at the exclusion of the government and
thereby at the exclusion of public policy.
These five challenges all demonstrate the need to develop
international and transnational responses to ransomware. Such
responses could more effectively address the scalability problems,
commons and jurisdictional concerns, and informational gaps
identified. The next Part will begin to sketch possible models for such
intranational regulation.
III. REDEFINING THE CRIME OF RANSOMWARE
A.

Ransomware and the Outlawry of Hostis Humani Generis

In the lead-up to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,
President Biden had a rhetorical gaffe, when he tried to distinguish
between a “minor incursion” by Russia into Ukraine and “more severe
incursions.”125 Part of what triggered the international community’s
dismay of Biden’s statement was the fact that aggression is an
internationally recognized crime. Under UNGA Resolution 3314, “[a]
war of aggression is a crime against international peace” 126 and “no
territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting from aggression
is or shall be recognized as lawful.” 127 The consequence of that is that
“[n]o consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic,
military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression.”128
Aggression is malum in se (evil by itself). It is defined by a baseline
of illegality. It is not the only crime of its kind. There are other
international delinquencies which have been outlawed by the
international community due to their unique nature. We may be able
to speak of three generations of such crimes:
Generation 1: piracy on the high seas and the slave trade
Generation 2: hostage taking and aerial hijacking
Generation 3: organized transnational crime and terrorism

companies-all-over/ [https://perma.cc/YH3D-BNAG] (archived Aug. 16, 2022) (citing a
former NSA operative who suggested that between “40 to 50 precent of U.S. security IT
startups are launched by former NSA staffers”).
125. See Tracy Wilkinson, Biden’s ‘Minor Incursion’ Comment Roils Diplomatic
Efforts to Halt Russian Invasion of Ukraine, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2022),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2022-01-20/bidens-minor-incursion-commentroils-diplomatic-efforts-to-halt-russian-invasion-of-ukraine [https://perma.cc/C2H6-JT
ZN] (archived Aug. 16, 2022).
126. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Definition of Aggression, art. 5(2) (Dec. 14, 1974).
127. Id. art. 5(3).
128. Id. art. 5(1).
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Maritime piracy, hostage taking, aerial hijacking, organized
transnational crime, terrorism, and now ransomware share a number
of core features: (1) all are threats to the intranational movement of
goods, services, and persons; (2) all depend on domestic legal systems
to prosecute offenders; (3) all have transnational components that
expand beyond the purely domestic environment of one state and
complicate reliance on national prosecutions; (4) all involve offences
against core human and universal values of freedom; (5) all involve
relatively low costs to perpetuate the assaults; and (6) all generate
massive victimization on scale due to the indiscriminate nature of the
attacks, thereby shocking the conscience of the international
community.129
It is in this sense that the international criminalization of
ransomware can naturally derive its legitimacy and internal logic from
the three generations that preceded it and become a sort of fourth
digital generation of the international criminalization and outlawry of
these “enemies of mankind” (hostis humani generis).130 In fact, it would
seem to be true that in all the previous generations that came before
it, “the concerted action taken by the global community to suppress
these crimes” demonstrated the very power and reach of the
“international legal order.”131 By traveling through time, one can
anchor ransomware prevention strategies to other previously tried and
recognized frameworks. Learning from the past and contemporary
history of the various generations of hostis humani generis crimes and
their outlawry is crucial for regulators. It allows us to gain new
understandings and insights about an emerging crime based on
parallel antecedents.

129. See NANCY DOUGLAS JOYNER, AERIAL HIJACKING AS AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIME 263 (1974); see also Evan F. Horsley, State-Sponsored Ransomware Through the
Lens of Maritime Piracy, 47 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 669, 681 (2019) (“In many ways
ransomware attacks are to the internet what pirates traditionally were to the seas . . .
The world as a whole has an abundance of experience dealing with maritime piracy. The
understanding that thousands of years of marine pillaging has given us, both in the form
of our more traditional understandings and in the form of our modern-day approach,
should guide us as we begin tackling the domain of cyberspace.”); HANDLER, SCHROEDER
& HERR, supra note 67, at 10 (“Ransomware is not a new phenomenon. As with
hijackings, addressing the root causes of ransomware requires a multifaceted approach,
mixing active and passive measures to block the realization of value by criminal groups
and deny groups their safe havens.”).
130. See U.S. v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. §§ 404, 423 (AM. L. INST. 1987))
(“Under the universal principle, states may prescribe and prosecute ‘certain offenses
recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave
trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts
of terrorism,’ even absent any special connection between the state and the offense.”).
131. JOYNER, supra note 129, at 266.

2022]

B.

THE LAW AND POLITICS OF RANSOMWARE

1205

Outlawing by Extension and Analogy or by Treaty Design?

Past scholarship is rich with examples demonstrating the
connections between the different generations of crimes. The literature
is filled with books that examine, for example, the nexus between
aircraft hijacking and piracy,132 terrorism and piracy,133 or terrorism
and organized crime.134 Reviewing this scholarship, and the relevant
treatises and customs associated with those crimes, a set of
requirements emerges. These “principles of outlawry” are common
across all the generations of crime and must form part of any future
outlawry of ransomware:135
(1) Proclamation Principle: the international character of
the crime is proclaimed and justified, thereby elevating it to
the status of an international crime.136
(2) Criminalization Principle: states are obligated to adopt
clear legislation and other enforcement measures that
impose under their domestic laws “heavy and effective
penalties” against perpetrators and increase deterrence.137
(3) Universal Jurisdiction Principle: affirming the right of
each state to apprehend the offender wherever they may be
found and prosecute and punish them for the offence,
irrespective of the place where the offence is committed or
felt.
(4) Prosecute or Extradite Principle: states are obligated to
prosecute or extradite (aut dedere, aut judicare) offenders if
they are found in their territory.
(5) Cooperation Principle: states are obligated to cooperate
and provide judicial assistance in all criminal matters
relating to the offence.
In order to internationally criminalize ransomware, rule
prescribers will need to engage in a process during which these

132. See, e.g., S.K. AGRAWALA, AIRCRAFT HIJACKING AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 73–
74 (1973); JOYNER, supra note 129.
133. See generally, e.g., DOUGLAS R. BURGESS, THE WORLD FOR RANSOM: PIRACY IS
TERRORISM, TERRORISM IS PIRACY (2010).
134. See generally, e.g., THE NEXUS BETWEEN ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM:
TYPES AND RESPONSES (Letizia Paoli et al. eds., 2022).
135. See generally AGRAWALA, supra note 132, at 73–74; JOHN F. MURPHY,
PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY
INITIATIVES (1985).
136. See AGRAWALA, supra note 132, at 74 (“[H]ijacking constitutes a crime against
humanity as such hijackers are enemies of mankind, hostis humani generis. This crime
constitutes an offence against a juridical value, human and universal, which
characterizes the crime, Juris gentium, above any individual interest. And the
fundamental characteristic of every offence Juris gentium is the obligatory punishment
by all states, wherever the offence is committed.”).
137. See id. at 73.
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principles will be adopted and recognized for the crime of ransomware.
This process can occur in one of two ways: through a specialized regime
(drafting and adopting a new international instrument for
ransomware) or through an inductive process that builds on the
existing instruments. Given the number of international treaties
covering all the previous generational crimes, it may be possible to
apply some of them by analogy and by extension to different categories
of ransomware. This subpart explores each of these options.
1.

New International Instrument

The 1960s and 1970s were a period of growth in the development
of new treaties. In fact, in the days leading up to the adoption of the
aerial hijacking conventions, drafters of those treaties strongly
believed that the issue could not be sufficiently addressed through the
formation of custom. They considered custom to be “too slow and
burdensome for global security needs.”138 It is for this reason that
treaty-based instruments were favored. The conventions were seen as
the speediest and most tailored mechanism to advance the rule of law
and deter and defend against hostage taking in the air.
The world has sure changed since then, both in terms of the
internal domestic politics within the United States and the broader
strategic competition environment on the world stage. It is now
considered practically impossible to imagine any international
instrument developing, certainly not on a subject as sensitive as
cybercrime, and certainly not at a time where Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine has reinvigorated Cold War political antics.
Nonetheless, it is also true that on 27 December 2019, the UN
General Assembly adopted Resolution 74/247 on “Countering the use
of information and communications technologies for criminal
purposes,” which set in motion a process to draft a global
comprehensive cybercrime treaty.139 On 26 May 2021, the UN General
Assembly adopted Resolution 75/282, mandating the production of a
complete draft and its delivery to the General Assembly in time for its
seventy-eighth session (beginning in September 2023 and concluding
in September 2024).140
The planned convention is already facing opposition. Over forty
digital rights organizations and experts warned that a proposed

138. JOYNER, supra note 129, at 264.
139. See G.A. Res. 74/247 (Dec. 27, 2019).
140. See G.A. Res. 75/282 (May 26, 2021). According to this resolution, the draft
convention shall consider existing international instruments and efforts at the national,
regional, and international levels on combating the use of information and
communications technologies for criminal purposes. This includes the work and
outcomes of the open-ended intergovernmental Expert Group to Conduct a
Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime. See id.
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convention poses a threat to human rights.141 The European data
protection supervisor expressed concern that, if not specifically
addressed, there is a “substantial risk that the final text of the
Convention could lead to a weakening of the fundamental rights and
freedoms of natural persons provided for by EU law, in particular their
rights to data protection and privacy.”142 Others cited Russia’s
leadership in promoting this treaty as proof of its improbability. These
commentators suggest that it is “hard to see how Russia could engage
in negotiations for a legally-binding cybercrime treaty in good faith. It's
harder still to see how it can negotiate at the United Nations for a
treaty based on upholding state sovereignty while simultaneously
invading a sovereign nation state”143 (alluding to Russian invasion into
and annexation of parts of Ukraine in 2022).
Even if the convention never materializes, the process of its
development could serve a function of its own. The deliberations
around the scope and text of the new treaty could become a diplomatic
epicenter for conversations about norms of the kind this Article
advocates for. Moreover, even if a comprehensive and universal regime
is not in reach, a club model could offer an interim solution whereby
the United States and the likeminded take the first step of introducing
the intranational crime of ransomware, with the hope that the regime
would ultimately be adopted by a sufficiently robust number of states.
2.

Analogy and Extension

As was already alluded to, ransomware overlaps at least partially
with several other crimes that are subject to treaty-based regulation.
These include (1) the 1979 International Convention against the
Taking of Hostages, (2) the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, (3) the 1997
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings,

141. See Katitza Rodriguez & George Wong, Letter to the United Nations to Include
Human Rights Safeguards in Proposed Cybercrime Treaty, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.
(Feb. 27, 2022), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/02/letter-united-nations-includehuman-rights-safeguards-proposed-cybercrime-treaty
[https://perma.cc/S9LS-E8XM]
(archived Aug. 24, 2022).
142. EUR. DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, OPINION 9/2022 ON THE
RECOMMENDATION FOR A COUNCIL DECISION AUTHORISING THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A
COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON COUNTERING THE USE OF INFORMATION

¶ 12 (May 18, 2022),
https://edps.europa.eu/system/files/2022-05/2022-05-18opinion_on_international_convention_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZZE-8MMZ] (archived
Sept. 2, 2022).
143. Jeff Burt, UN Mulls Russia's Pitch for Cybercrime Treaty, THE REG. (Mar. 7,
2022), https://www.theregister.com/2022/03/07/russia-un-cybercrime-treaty/ [https://
perma.cc/C8VB-M3UZ] (archived Aug. 24, 2022) (quoting Mercedes Page, Founder and
CEO of Young Australians in International Affairs).
AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES FOR CRIMINAL PURPOSES
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(4) the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, (5) the 2000 United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime, (6) the 2010 Convention on
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil
Aviation (Beijing Convention), and (7) the 2010 Protocol
Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft.144
Applying these treaties to ransomware could open the door to
substantive enforcement opportunities. By selecting relevant
provisions for strategic application,145 new obligations may emerge to
both constrain sheltering states and empower victim states. Options
for litigation may also be generated. While providing a full exploration
of each of the above listed treaties and frameworks is outside the scope
of this Article, I will anecdotally examine a few to offer insight into the
Article’s proposed suggestion.
The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages
defines the act of “hostage taking” in Article 1. It reads,
[a]ny person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue
to detain another person (hereinafter: referred to as the "hostage") in order to
compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental
organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain
from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the
hostage commits the offence of taking of hostages ("hostage-taking") within the
meaning of this Convention.146

Note that the “Article makes no reference to the manner of seizure
of detention,”147 and that many instrumentalities short of the use of
force that helps sustain the seizure or detention could “suffice to bring

144. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316
U.N.T.S. 205; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 222; International Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256; International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 2178
U.N.T.S. 197; United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov.
15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating
to International Civil Aviation, Sept. 10, 2010, 50 I.L.M. 141; Protocol Supplementary to
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, INT’L MARITIME ORG.
(Oct. 14, 2005), https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/SUA-Treaties.aspx
[https://perma.cc/2Y95-VPZT] (archived Aug. 24, 2022).
145. See MICHAEL HEAD, CRIMES AGAINST THE STATE: FROM TREASON TO
TERRORISM 275 (2011).
146. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, supra note 144,
art. 1. As a matter of future law there is certainly a possibility for liberal-rule appliers
to consider whether the capture of data should be seen as having similar characteristics
as the detention of one’s person. After all, some argue that our digital self is now an
extension of our physical self. See, e.g., Russell W. Belk, Extended Self in a Digital World,
40(3) J. CONSUMER RSCH. 477 (2013).
147. JOSEPH LAMBERT, TERRORISM AND HOSTAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
COMMENTARY ON THE HOSTAGES CONVENTION 80 (1990).
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the conduct within the scope of this Convention.”148 If we return to our
basic scenario, we can examine this test case by adjusting the facts ever
so slightly. What if the attacked V1 was a hospital, and what if R’s
ransomware attack locked a certain patient in the operating room, with
the physicians outside of the room, unable to assist her. At this point,
a ransomware could result in further delays in surgeries and ultimately
can even lead to death.149 Also consider the ransomware on Colonial
Pipeline which resulted in significant gas shortages and multiple states
issuing emergency proclamations.150 What if hackers knew of the likely
gas shortages and aimed their attack at restricting the movement of
certain individuals. Or what if hackers targeted a plane, instead of a
gas pipeline, forcing it to stay on the tarmac for hours with the
passengers on board. The wording of Article 1 may extend to cover some
resulting outcomes occurring from all of these scenarios. After all,
clever litigators may try to argue that each scenario demonstrates a
broader form of “detention” as used in Article 1.
Such an interpretation could have dramatic consequences because,
under Article 16 of the International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages, disputes about the convention may be referred to the
International Court of Justice (and as both the United States and
Russia are parties to this treaty with no reservations, this could
theoretically lead to a potential case in the future).
By way of a second analogy, compare the customary prohibition
on terrorism with the crime of ransomware. “Terrorism” is defined as
encompassing three key elements:
(i) the perpetration of a criminal act (such as murder, kidnapping, hostagetaking, arson, and so on), or threatening such an act;
(ii) the intent to spread fear among the population (which would generally entail
the creation of public danger) or directly or indirectly coerce a national or
international authority to take some action, or to refrain from taking it; and

148. Id. at 81.
149. See William Ralston, The Untold Story of a Cyberattack, A Hospital and A
Dying Woman, WIRED (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/ransomwarehospital-death-germany [https://perma.cc/F3ZX-CEDN] (archived Aug. 24, 2022); Kevin
Collier, Baby Died Because of Ransomware Attack on Hospital, Suit Says, NBC NEWS
(Sept. 30, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/baby-died-due-ransomware-attackhospital-suit-claims-rcna2465 [https://perma.cc/J9R2-KV83] (archived Aug. 24, 2022).
150. See Sean Michael Kerner, Colonial Pipeline hack explained: Everything you
need
to
know,
TECHTARGET
(Apr.
26,
2022),
https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/feature/Colonial-Pipeline-hack-explainedEverything-you-need-to-know
[https://perma.cc/
7WEB-ZJ82] (archived Aug. 24, 2022).
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(iii) when the act involves a transnational element.151

Under this definition, certain types of ransomware attacks may be
considered a form of terrorism. Consider organized group R1 operating
with some political motivations or ties to the intelligence apparatus of
country R. If the attack is targeting a public utility (like a bank or
railway company) with the knowledge that its business interruption
will trigger fear amongst the population, there is certainly the
possibility of defining the act as terrorism.
A final analogy could be found in the wording of the UN
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. Article 2(a)
defines an “organized criminal group” as
(1) a group of three or more persons that was not randomly formed;
(2) existing for a period of time;
(3) acting in concert with the aim of committing at least one crime punishable by
at least four years' incarceration;
(4) in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material
benefit.152

This definition perhaps fits the best, as nearly all ransomware attacks
are launched by gangs who will easily qualify as meeting these
requirements.
A specialized international regime to regulate the crime of
ransomware remains the best solution for ransomware’s
underenforcement problem. Nonetheless, given current political
instability, it is very unlikely that a treaty on ransomware will be
drafted and adopted in the near future. The three examples above
hopefully show that there are other solutions to regulating
ransomware, including by analogizing and extending the application of
existing treaty and customary frameworks.
IV. BUILDING THE RANSOMWARE ENFORCEMENT TOOLKIT
This final Part of the Article will examine the implications of
recognizing ransomware as an international crime. It will specifically

151. Prosecutor v. Ayyash, STL-11-01/1, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable
Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, ¶ 85 (Feb.
16, 2011). It should be noted that there remains “to this day” a fierce debate about
whether the definition of the crime of terrorism has reached a customary-agreed
definition, the Ayyash decision notwithstanding. See Cóman Kenny, Prosecuting Crimes
of International Concern: Islamic State at the ICC?, 33 UTRECHT J. I NT’L & EUR. L. 120,
131 (2017).
152. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, supra
note 144, art. 2(a).

2022]

THE LAW AND POLITICS OF RANSOMWARE

1211

look at three areas of development that could assist in closing the
ransomware underenforcement gap by directly addressing some of the
root causes of ransomware, as mapped out in Part I. In particular, I
will consider the following likely implications: (1) expanding policies
for naming and shaming harboring states, (2) authorizing
extraterritorial cyber enforcement and prosecution, and (3) advancing
strategies for strengthening cybersecurity at home.
A.

Naming and Shaming Harboring States

The problem faced by existing international bodies tasked with
regulating cyberspace, like the UNGGE and the UN Open Ended
Working Group, is that they have so far failed to generate a large
enough consensus for their conclusions. Namely, these deliberations
have failed to result in agreement on the specifics surrounding the
application of each of the norms for responsible behavior in
cyberspace.153 Given that the crime of ransomware is likely to focus
only on individuals and private gangs, it perhaps, if negotiated
effectively, could be a low-hanging fruit for negotiating governments.
This is because any criminalization is unlikely to prove an impediment
to national cyber-related activities.154
Furthermore, changing the terminology around ransomware from
a domestic crime to an international delinquency––said in one breath
alongside piracy, terrorism, and slavery––would have an expressive
function.155 It would raise the stakes in diplomatic negotiations and
will help secure broader agreement between allies on the need for
deterrence and enforcement strategies against states that turn a blind
eye to ransomware.
Moreover, it will serve the function of “condemnation” within the
broader cyber accusation theory as developed by Martha Finnemore

153. See generally Arindrajit Basu, Irene Poetranto & Justin Lau, The UN
Struggles to Make Progress on Securing Cyberspace, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L
PEACE (May 19, 2021), https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/05/19/un-struggles-tomake-progress-on-securing-cyberspace-pub-84491
[https://perma.cc/K564-D8WA]
(archived Aug. 24, 2022).
154. Cf. CHRISTOPHER J. D’URSO, NOWHERE TO HIDE: INVESTIGATING THE USE OF
UNILATERAL ALTERNATIVES TO EXTRADITION IN UNITED STATES PROSECUTIONS OF
TRANSNATIONAL C YBERCRIME 285 (2021) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Oxford) (on file with author) (suggesting that “cybercrime is not likely to progress toward
cooperation as occurred in the case of both terrorism and drug trafficking. With those
offenses, host countries recognized the substantial domestic harms that the illicit
conduct caused and were often eager to assist in handing over the perpetrators. Yet,
cybercriminals know not to target their fellow citizens, engendering little, if any,
domestic harms. This is precisely why certain states have turned to sponsoring such
conduct rather than combatting it.”).
155. See generally Alex Geisinger & Michael Ashley Stein, A Theory of Expressive
International Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 77 (2007) (discussing the literature around the role
of normative pressure in influencing rational actors to alter their behavior).
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and Duncan Hollis.156 In other words, it will bring shape and teeth to
the “expression of disapproval” upon a state’s attribution of a
ransomware operations to a harboring state.157 The stronger the
condemnation––especially where international crimes come into play–
–the more likely it is that the accused will change its behavior.158
Moreover, the condemnation helps articulate “good” and “bad”
behavior and thereby supports the formation of new norms and legal
rules.159
B.

Extraterritorial Enforcement and Prosecution160

As explained before, one of the biggest challenges posed by the
threat of ransomware is the inability of states to enforce their criminal
laws against hacker groups due to jurisdictional limitations generated
by the act of harboring.161 By housing ransomware servers and
networks in their territory, these harboring states shield the hackers
from enforcement action. They know that victim states are unlikely to
intrude on their territorial sovereignty and are therefore reassured
that that sovereignty will offer sufficient protection to the criminals,
many of whom are their nationals.
How might we be able to address this form of abuse? How might
we be able to preserve the traditional prohibition on extraterritorial
enforcement while still working around that prohibition to allow victim
states to engage in effective criminal investigations and disruptive
enforcement activities? One solution comes from exploring the work of
Cedric Ryngaert. Ryngaert proposed the idea of a “positive sovereignty
principle” which he described in the following way: “States are allowed
to apply their laws to a foreign situation, to the extant the State that
has the stronger nexus to the situation fails to adequately deal with, in
manner that is, on aggregate, harmful to, the regulatory interests of
the international community.”162 When a country like Iran, North
Korea, or Russia provides safe harbor to hackers—sometimes even
indirectly employing them163—those countries should be denied the

156. See generally Martha Finnemore & Duncan B. Hollis, Beyond Naming and
Shaming: Accusations and International Law in Cybersecurity, 31(3) EUR. J. INT’L L. 969
(2020).
157. Id. at 989.
158. See id. at 992.
159. Id. at 993.
160. Parts of this Section repeat analysis I have argued elsewhere in Lubin, supra
note 99.
161. See supra notes 99–111 and accompanying text.
162. See CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 190 (2d ed.
2015).
163. See Frank Bajak, How the Kremlin Provides a Safe Harbor for Ransomware,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 16, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/business-technologygeneral-news-government-and-politicsc9dab7eb3841be45dff2d93ed3102999
[https://perma.
cc/74C4-5DRF] (archived Aug. 24, 2022).
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ability to abuse their sovereignty in this way. If ransomware is
recognized as an international crime, then relying on sovereignty to
further sustain it would become “harmful to the regulatory interests of
the international community” precisely in the way that Ryngaert
suggested. That would mean that states would finally have the right
to investigate violations of their criminal laws and enforce their
judgements extraterritorially without fear of a conflict with the laws of
the harboring state.164
Thinking beyond the issue of cyber investigation and enforcement,
international criminalization of ransomware could serve other
important functions. Recall that “inconsistencies in approaches,
definitions, and sanctions can hinder international cooperation,
particularly when it comes to assistance.”165 Setting a universally
agreed upon definition of the crime of ransomware, capable of adoption
into domestic legislation, could introduce greater harmonization of
substantive criminal laws, at least amongst like-minded countries.
Moreover, obligations to cooperate and to extradite or prosecute could
further support the efforts of individual states to bring perpetrators of
ransomware offences to justice.
C.

Enhancing Cybersecurity at Home

Historical analysis demonstrates the value of internationally
criminalizing certain global crimes, such as piracy, aerial hijacking,
and terrorism. In each of the three cases, the generation of
international treaties and regimes led to greater centralization and
harmonization of rules, and the formulation of new security protocols
and best practices for prevention and mitigation of harm. They also
helped reshape the public/private partnership and discourse as well as
create new transnational agencies and partnerships which in turn
created even further opportunities for standard-setting. Take aerial
hijacking as a great example. At first, the problem was seen as one
subject to the self-help measures taken by each of the individual

164. D’Urso argues that unilateral investigation and enforcement against
cybercrime is “here to stay.” He, however, focuses his analysis on the efficacy and
availability of luring operations. These are undercover operations aimed at encouraging
cyber criminals to leave their country of residence (the harboring state) under false
pretenses, so to be able to effectuate arrests and trials. He concludes by developing an
interesting framework for responsibly and prudently deploying such lure operations in
cybercrime cases. See D’URSO, supra note 154, at 218–80. While such operations could
be fruitful in the fight against ransomware, the intelligence necessary to locate and
identify ransomware gang members (as well as stop their operations in real time) will
depend on cyber means of investigation. To employ such means states will still need to
respond to any challenges imposed by the application of the prohibition on
extraterritorial enforcement in cyberspace. As such the analysis offered in this paper
remains relevant even in the context of D’Urso’s proposal.
165. JODY R. WESTBY, INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO COMBATING CYBERCRIME 62
(2003).
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airlines.166 In fact, there were even academics who suggested that the
pursuit of international legal instruments was a “serious
miscalculation”167 and that hijackings should be addressed as a
“technical problem” rather than a “legal one.”168 Those who believed
this view argued that it was the role of flight technicians and
professional airlines to address the problem of hijackings, and not the
responsibility of government lawyers and foreign diplomats.169
But the proceedings and scholarship that culminated with the
adoption of the international conventions on skyjacking produced a
significant realization for the participating countries. It affirmed that
the old way of dealing with the problem, the one centered around the
role of private entities, was in fact “sporadic, fragmented and shortterm, determined by the whims, enthusiasms, apathies, and day-today policies of individual airlines and airport authorities.”170 In the
previous world order, “safety [was] an illusion.”171
This ultimately led to what passengers now take for granted a set
of standardized international precautions taken in the design of
aircrafts, in running security checks at airports, and in the
organization of flights from takeoff to landing. Personal searches and
searches of luggage, metal-detectors, and sniffing dogs were put in
place through a process which first began in the adoption of these
international instruments.172
National and international programs were formulated to
subsidize and help train and support the adoption of better security
measures at airports and onboard aircrafts.173 As some researchers
have noted, “[a] steady decline in hijackings was driven instead by a
collective effort among victim states and the private sector, employing
a cocktail of active and passive measures—all of which holds lessons
for policymakers working to combat ransomware.”174
The development of an international agenda for fighting and
criminalizing ransomware will set in motion new fora and new public-

166. See PETER CLYNE, AN A NATOMY OF SKYJACKING 138 (1973) (noting that “[i]t
was only very recently that self-help was seen to be inadequate for the needs of a modern
state, and that the problem of keeping order and enforcing the law came to be accepted
as a national responsibility”).
167. Charles F. Butler, The Path to International Legislation Against Hijacking,
in AERIAL PIRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 27, 34 (Edward McWhinney ed., 1971).
168. Michael Pourcelet, Hijacking: The Limitations of the International Treaty
Approach, in AERIAL PIRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 55, 58 (Edward McWhinney ed.,
1971).
169. See id.
170. CLYNE, supra note 166, at 177.
171. Id.
172. See CLYNE, supra note 166, at 181–82. Clyne further demonstrates how new
coalitions were formed to demands these new precautions be implemented. Id. at 174
(discussing the role of the British Airline’s Pilots Association in mandating the
introduction of security measures at Heathrow airport).
173. See generally HANDLER, SCHROEDER & HERR, supra note 67.
174. See id. at 5.
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private coalitions to advance global, uniform, and standardized
preventive security measures, crisis management structures, and
response policies.
Moreover, the international criminalization of ransomware could
impact what commercial insurers and individual victims are willing to
do by generating an ethical discourse that will latch onto any concrete
laws and regulations. It could enhance the expectation of reporting to
law enforcement and reduce the number of ransom payments, knowing
that in paying the ransom one might be deemed complicit in a crime
against mankind. In other words, the internationalization of the crime
could serve as a counterbalance to the sense that some victims have
that their individual interests should outweigh any communal or
collective societal interest. By merely framing the crime as one akin to
terrorism or piracy, individual victims could develop a completely
different lens and internal compass through which to view what
reasonable responses are once a ransomware attack materializes.175
This could also lead to a healthier ransomware insurance market, a
market which currently suffers from soaring premiums and resulting
gaps in coverage.176
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article was produced as part of the Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law’s Spring 2022 Symposium. The title of that
symposium was “The Law of Cyberterrorism.” Whereas “cyber
terrorism research and policy has hit somewhat of a deadlock in recent
years,”177 I read the call for symposium papers in a more general way:
as an invitation to dig into the interoperability between cyberattacks
like ransomware and traditional terrorism. The more I delved into the
research, the more I realized that the international crime of terrorism
has a rich history that can be tied to previous generations of parallel
crimes: a string of delinquencies going back to maritime piracy and
skyjacking. As I continued my research, I concluded that ransomware

175. A similar process took place in the United Kingdom in the context of
kidnapping and terrorism insurance. See Asaf Lubin, Public Policy and the Insurability
of Cyber Risk, 5 J.L. & TECH. TEX. 45, 97–98 (2021).
176. See e.g. Cheryl Winokur Munk, Buying Cyber Insurance Gets Trickier as
Attacks
Proliferate,
Costs
Rise,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Aug.
8,
2022),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/buying-cyber-insurance-gets-trickier-as-attacksproliferate-costs-rise-11659951000 [https://perma.cc/5LED-LF3N] (archived Oct. 10,
2022); Kane Wells, Cyber insurance study suggests businesses lack ransomware
insurance, REINSURANCE NEWS (Aug. 22, 2022), https://www.reinsurancene.ws/cyberinsurance-study-suggests-businesses-lack-ransomware-insurance/
[https://perma.cc/B53B-FUGJ] (archived Oct. 10, 2022).
177. See STEFAN SOESANTO, ELCANO ROYAL INST., CYBER TERRORISM. WHY IT
EXISTS,
WHY
IT
DOESN’T,
AND
WHY
IT
WILL
7
(2020),
https://media.realinstitutoelcano.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/ari47-2020-soesantocyber-terrorism-why-it-exists-why-it-doesnt-and-why-it-will.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V6SK-26T9] (archived Aug. 24, 2022).
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forms another link in this cross-generational family of international
crimes.
Of course, proposing a “fool-proof legal framework and creat[ing]
an international regime for preventing and deterring” international
crimes, like ransomware, is not easy.178 As S.K. Agrawala teaches us,
“[m]any factors, political and economic play their part, and the efforts
of nations with divergent interests have to be coordinated.”179 But
building on the successes of the past and learning from history is
perhaps our best bet. We therefore must explore historically
contextualized regulatory solutions to the problem of ransomware.
Usually in their academic writing, law professors like to say that
through their research they have discovered a paradigm-shifting new
theoretical frame. I am arguing the exact opposite of that in this paper.
In my research I have not found a new frame, but rather an old one.
Just by way of an anecdotal example, consider the words of Douglas
Burgess in his book “The World for Ransom”:
[I]f international terrorists are neither ordinary criminals nor enemy
combatants, what are they? There is an answer. Old, dusty, anachronistic
perhaps, but eminently workable and entirely accurate.
They are pirates.
This book will prove that a precedent for terrorism exists in piracy—that they
are, in fact, the same crime. Once we have a precedent, we have a law: terrorists
will borrow not only pirates’ unique status as enemies of human race . . . but also
the equally unique measures accorded to states to hunt them down. 180

My Article is merely an expansion of Burgess’s controversial
claim, extending his arguments deep into the digital age. For, you see,
ransom gangs are transnational organized criminals; they are
terrorists; they are hijackers; they are pirates. And like Burgess says,
once the international community recognizes that, it will have a
relevant law to apply—be it as a matter of extending existing treaty
frameworks or by developing new regimes based on old insights. If one
views the world through this lens, it is no longer surprising to read a
newspaper story with the headline: “Exclusive: U.S. to Give
Ransomware Hacks Similar Priority as Terrorism.”181 Of course the
United States will, for the two crimes are one in the same.
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